The Pillars of U.S. Cold War Strategy in Europe

Germany and the Coming Struggle for the Atlantic Alliance, Limes: Rivista Italiana Di Geopolitica (Italy), June 2, 2022. "The U.S. strategy for Europe after 1945 rested on three pillars."

On Steve Jobs

Steve Jobs, Uniquely American, Contentions, October 6, 2011. "Jobs may at times have denied that technology could genuinely change life, but as President Obama said in his statement yesterday, he “exemplified the spirit of American ingenuity” and “changed the way each of us sees the world.” On the subject of change, the last word belongs to Jobs. When he sought to recruit Pepsi’s John Sculley – an ill-fated hire – to become Apple’s president in 1983, Jobs’ legendary pitch to a reluctant Sculley was pure and true: “Do you want to sell sugar water for the rest of your life, or do you want to come with me and change the world?”"

Iran, the USSR and the Containment Analogy

Containing a Nuclear Iran: Difficult, Costly, and Dangerous, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2157, with James Phillips, February 14, 2011. "Proponents of a containment policy toward Iran are ignoring the harsh realities inherent in seriously pursuing such a policy. First, the U.S. has been trying to contain Iran since the Iranian revolution in 1979, with little success. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, it will become even more difficult to contain. A serious containment policy will require the U.S. to maintain a credible threat of force against Iran. This will be even more difficult if Iran goes nuclear because the U.S. will have lost credibility. A containment policy will also require the U.S. to support the undemocratic governments in the countries neighboring Iran, which will pose many political dilemmas. Instead of pursuing a policy of containment, which would be a policy in name only, the U.S. should keep the military option alive, defend itself and its allies, and seek both to weaken the regime’s economic base and to empower and encourage its domestic adversaries."

Skybolt and New START

That Good Old 'Pattern of Cooperation'," Contentions, February 8, 2011. "Over the last few days, the conservative media and blogosphere in the U.S. and Britain have been roiled by WikiLeaks documents suggesting that, in order to secure Russia’s agreement to the New START Treaty, the U.S. agreed to disclose information about the Trident missiles it transfers to Britain. Media Matters predictably claims that there is nothing untoward involved, it’s all an invention of the “right-wing media.” And P.J. Crowley argued that New START simply “carried forward and updated this notification procedure” from the 1991 START Treaty. Yet a careful reading of the 1991 and 2011 treaties reveals significant differences between the U.S.’s obligations vis-à-vis Britain and Russia in these treaties."

Another New START Problem

New START and the Special Relationship: A Case to Answer, Heritage Foundation Foundry, February 8, 2011. "Last Friday, British newspapers reported that the U.S. had agreed to supply Russia with sensitive information on Britain’s nuclear deterrent in order to win Russian agreement to the New START Treaty. Over the weekend, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley described this claim as “bunk” and asserted that New START simply “carried forward and updated this notification procedure to the new treaty” from the 1991 START Treaty. The Wikileaks document on which the original story was based, and the treaties of 1991 and 2011, tell a different story."

On A Contradiction in US Cold War Grand Strategy

Reagan Kept Faith in America, BigPeace, February 6, 2011. "One of Reagan’s greatest contributions was to return to the commonsense faith that America worked, that the Soviet Union could not, and that we should, and could, win the Cold War by playing to our strengths and against their weaknesses. He was a remarkable orator, and one who was not afraid to speak simple truths plainly: his statement that the Soviet Union was an evil empire shocked an intelligentsia unused to hearing the obvious about an enemy that many no longer regarded as such. But he was more than an orator. Reagan believed that values could drive strategy, that if the U.S. and the West returned to freedom, if they abandoned the controls of the Nixon and Carter era, if they reduced taxes, if they put government back in its proper place, the U.S. would not only be doing the right thing. It would be fighting the Cold War to win."

The Shah As Good Guy

Cold War Revisionism Run Wild, Contentions, February 3, 2011. "As J.E. Dyer pointed out a few days ago, the standard treatment of the Cold War in the academy of the 1970s and 1980s was that it was a bad idea. That argument had many facets, but among the most consistently presented of them was the theme that the artificial Cold War scare had been used to justify close American relations with anti-Communist dictators. This anti-Cold War bias has, to my mind, waned slightly, in part because of the work of historians like John Lewis Gaddis, and in part because it’s now history, and as such is safe for everyone to be in favor of. Indeed, it’s so safe that President Obama is free to call for Sputnik moments. Still, the argument about American foreign policy endures."

Margaret Thatcher and "A Real Detente"

How Margaret Thatcher Helped to End the Cold War, Heritage Foundation WebMemo #2631, September 28, 2009. "When Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, many in the West had come to believe that the Cold War could not and should not be won, that anti-Communism was morally wrong, and that the future lay in détente between the superpowers and the evolution of democracy into ever-deepening state socialism. By the time she left office, the Berlin Wall had fallen and Eastern Europe was liberated. A year later, the Soviet Union crumbled into the dustbin of history. Democracy and freedom were on the advance."